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The National Minimum Wage (NMW) that was introduced in April 1999 is 
sometimes paraded as evidence of the Blair government’s commitment to reversing 
the rise in inequality that was characteristic of the last 25 years.  But, because the 
NMW has been set at a very modest level and because aggregate evidence suggests 
very small spill-over effects, it has had only a minimal impact on UK wage inequality.  
But, the small spill-over effects might be because of the small numbers of workers 
affected and it is possible that there was widespread anticipation of the introduction of 
the NMW making the impact effect appear very small. 
  In this paper we have investigated these issues using data collected in a postal 
survey of care homes where the NMW affected 40% of workers.  But, we still find no 
evidence of large spill-over effects and very small amounts of anticipation of the 
NMW.   
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The National Minimum Wage (NMW) that was introduced in April 1999 is 
sometimes paraded as evidence of the Blair government’s commitment to reversing 
the rise in inequality that was characteristic of the 1980s (mostly) and the 1990s (a 
little).  But, how much of an effect has it really had?  One would expect the impact to 
depend on: 
-  the level at which the NMW is set 
-  the level of compliance 
-  the extent of spill-overs on those initially paid more than the minimum 
And, trivially, the measure of wage inequality that one is looking at.  In other work 
(Dickens and Manning, 2002, 2003) we have used data from the Labour Force Survey 
to investigate some of these issues.  The conclusion from that research was that the 
NMW had been set at a level much lower than originally envisaged (see Low Pay 
Commission, 1998; Metcalf, 1999), affecting no more than 6% of workers and quite 
possibly less.  And, that there seemed to be little in the way of spill-overs further up 
the wage distribution.  The bottom line was that while the impact of the NMW was 
detectable at the 5
th percentile, it had no noticeable impact on the 10
th percentile.  The 
effect on the most commonly used measures of wage inequality was minimal.  The 
subsequent up-ratings in the NMW have done little to alter this: our estimates suggest 
that the rise in the adult NMW to £4.10 per hour in October 2001 was broadly 
equivalent in its real impact to the initial adult rate of £3.60 per hour. 
  But, this research left a number of questions unanswered.  First, suitable 
earnings data for the analysis of the impact of the NMW only started being available 
in March 1999, one month before the introduction.  Although there only seems to be a 
small spike in the wage distribution (approximately 1%) at what was going to be the NMW in March 1999, it is possible that the apparently small impact effect was partly 
the result of employers anticipating the NMW and raising wages in advance.  And, 
perhaps the apparently small spill-over effects were the result of the low level at 
which the NMW was set: one might think that the pressure for the restoration of wage 
differentials would be very small if very few workers are having their wage raised by 
the minimum.  And, underlying this, there are still concerns about the quality of the 
earnings measures in the LFS: only about 40% of workers are reporting an hourly rate 
and the remaining 60% have to be ‘estimated’ in some way as the only earnings 
measure available for them is weekly earnings divided by weekly hours, a measure 
that has been shown to have very large measurement error. 
  In this paper, we try to answer some of these questions by using data from 
another source, a postal survey of workers in residential homes for the elderly.  Our 
sample design was to sample the population of UK care homes before and after the 
introduction of the minimum wage.  We obtained lists of all homes from the Yellow 
Pages Business Database in July 1998 (for the pre-minimum sampling) and in May 
1999 (for the post-minimum sampling).  There were 11635 care homes in the former 
and 11036 homes in the latter.  As one of the things one might be interested in is the 
extent to which employers adjusted wages before the minimum wage introduction we 
sampled (based on area stratification) one-ninth of the homes in each of the nine 
months before minimum wage introduction, and then we re-sampled the homes 
(including new homes), again one-ninth at a time, in the nine months following the 
introduction of the wage floor. We also identified home closures that occurred over 
this time period. 
  The questionnaire was mailed to the manager of the care homes and asked a 
range of questions about the home and about the views managers (who are often home owners) had about the minimum wage. For obvious reasons, the precise nature of the 
attitudinal questions was different for questionnaires sent out before and after the 
introduction of the minimum wage.
1  Managers were also asked to provide data on job 
title, sex, age, length of service, possession of a nursing qualification, weekly hours 
and hourly wages for all workers.   
This survey might be expected to remedy some of the weaknesses of the LFS 
data.  First, because we have data for the 9 months prior to the introduction of the 
NMW, we can address the question of anticipation by employers.  Secondly, in this 
sector, a very large number of workers were affected by the NMW so we can address 
the question of whether the small spill-over effects observed in the aggregate data 
were the results of the small numbers being paid the NMW.  And, for most of the 
workers, wages are reported as an hourly rate so the problem of measurement error is 
also reduced.  However, while this survey does have its strengths relative to the LFS, 
there are also some weaknesses.  First, it is a postal survey with a response rate of 
only 20% raising concerns about representativeness.  Appendix 1 provides some re-
assurance on this point: the distribution of the characteristics of workers in our sample 
and equivalent workers (i.e. in the same occupation and industry) in the LFS are very 
similar: it appears that our sample is fairly representative. 
  The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we present basic 
information on the numbers paid below, at and just above the NMW in the nine 
months before and after the introduction of the NMW.  The second section then 
considers the change in the whole distribution of wages. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The actual questionnaires are available on request from the authors. 1. Spikes 
We start be presenting information on the proportion of adult workers paid the NMW.  
Figure 1 presents a time series for the months before and after the introduction of the 
NMW on the proportion of adult workers (i.e. those aged 22 or above) in our sample 
paid below the NMW (£3.60 per hour), exactly the NMW, and in the region £3.60-
£3.80 and £3.80-£4.00.  Several points stand out.  First, prior to the introduction of the 
NMW, a large proportion (about 40%) of workers in this sector were paid below what 
is going to become the NMW.  This proportion falls only slowly until the month of 
introduction when it falls to very low levels. 
  Several conclusions are prompted by this finding.  First, there is not much in 
the way of anticipation by employers of the introduction of the NMW: virtually all of 
the fall in the proportion of workers paid below what is going to be the minimum 
wage occurs in the month of introduction: to a first approximation, there is a `big 
bang’ effect.  Secondly, this data does not suggest that there is a serious problem with 
non-compliance. 
  But, this might be a complacent conclusion that could be misleading because 
employers who do not comply with the NMW are unlikely to respond to our survey 
or, if they do, to lie and claim they are paying the NMW when they are not.  There are 
several pieces of evidence that make us think that non-compliance is relatively rare 
e.g. sample response rates do not fall much at introduction and the distribution of 
wages in our sample is similar to that reported by workers in the Labour Force 
Survey.  But there are other ways in which we can look for evidence of non-
compliance. 
  In the first wave of our survey conducted before the introduction in the NMW 
when there was nothing illegal about paying any hourly wage we did not mention that there would be a follow-up survey conducted after the introduction.  So, there is no 
particular reason to believe that employers who were subsequently failing to comply 
would be less likely to respond to the first wave of the questionnaire.  But, it does 
seem plausible to imagine that employers who were subsequently breaking the law 
would be less likely to respond to the second wave.  If this is the case we would 
expect to see evidence that those who were initially paying below the NMW are less 
likely to respond in the second wave assuming (as is plausible) that employers who 
were initially paying above £3.60 per hour continue to do so.  Table 1 investigates this 
hypothesis estimating a probit model for whether there is a response in the second 
wave as a function of the reported level of wages in the first wave.  As a measure of 
the likely impact of the NMW we use the wage gap the percentage increase in the 
wage bill required to raise all workers to the minimum wage. 
  Whatever the controls included, there is no evidence in Table 1 that employers 
paying initially below the NMW are less likely to respond to the second wave which 
we might expect to see if there was widespread non-compliance. 
  There remains the possibility that employers simply lie in their responses.  But 
we think that employers are much more likely to throw our survey in the bin than to 
go to the effort of lying in responding to it.  And, as mentioned earlier, the distribution 
of hourly wages in our sample is very close to that reported by workers in the Labour 
Force Survey.  Evidence from this and other surveys suggesting relatively high levels 
of compliance need to be put against evidence like that contained in Boyle (2000) that 
there are egregious cases of non-compliance: this report also singles out the care 
home sector as being particularly problematic.   Another feature of Figure 1 is that the proportions paid £3.60 in the 
subsequent months is somewhat below those paid below £3.60 in the prior months.  
This is suggestive of spill-over effects: this is the subject of the next section. 
 
2. Spill-Over  Effects 
It is relatively easy to provide theoretical models for why the minimum wage 
should have an effect on the wages of those paid above the minimum i.e. those 
workers who are not directly affected by it.  For example, Teulings (2000) presents a 
competitive model of the labour market in which those workers initially paid just 
above the minimum wage are close substitutes for those paid just below it so that one 
cannot alter the wages of one group without having a big influence on the wages of 
other groups.  And non-competitive models of the labour market can also be used to 
explain the existence of spill-over effects. 
  How large are spill-over effects in practice?  The evidence on this is 
surprisingly small but there is a recent literature on the US federal minimum wage 
that suggests they are quite large.  A number of papers (diNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 
1998; Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2000) have argued that the minimum wage has a more 
substantial impact on the wage distribution than previously thought and that much of 
the rise in US wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution is the result of 
changes (or lack of them) in the federal minimum wage.  Because the direct effect of 
the minimum wage is small, this can only be explained if there are sizeable spill-over 
effects. 
Both Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000) estimate the spill-over effect though it is 
not the main focus of their papers.  The approach in Teulings (2000) is based on a 
competitive model of the labour market in which technology is assumed to have the realistic but messy feature of a ‘decreasing in distance elasticity of substitution’ 
between workers with different skill levels.  Lee (1999) takes a less structural 
approach and this is the one we will use here.  He assumes that, in the absence of the 
minimum wage, the wage at position F in the wage distribution is given by w*(F): call 
this the latent wage distribution.  With the introduction of a minimum wage, wm, the 
actual wage distribution, w(F), will differ from the latent wage distribution.  For 
example, if there are no spill-over effects and the minimum wage is fully-enforced 
then the wage distribution will be given by: 
() * ()m a x ( * () , 0 ) m wF w F w w F =+ −      (1) 
Lee (1999) generalizes this and proposes the following model that allows for spill-
over effects: 
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where  0 β >  is a parameter which measures the size of the spill-over effect.  If  0 β =  
the model of (2) reduces to that of (1) so that an increase in β  is an increase in the 
spill-over effect.  The spill-over effect, s(F), can be written as:  
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i.e. it is the difference between the total effect [w(F)-w*(F)] and the direct effect as 
measured by the final term in (1).  Inspection of (3) shows that the spill-over effects in 
the Lee model depend only on the gap between the minimum wage and the latent 
wage and the single parameter β .  There are several implications of the particular 
model of spill-overs in (3).  The spill-over effects are largest for those just affected by 
the minimum wage (i.e. those for whom wm=w*(F)) and, for these workers, the increase in log wages is equal to β .  Secondly, the spill-over effects decline as one 
moves away from these wages, the rate of decline also being determined by β . 
(
( wF
  In a more general model of spill-overs, one might think of estimating: 
-  the wage at which the spill-over effect is greatest 
-  the maximum spill-over effect 
-  how wide are the spill-over effects. 
i.e. a three parameter model instead of the single parameter model estimated by Lee 
(1999).  However, the Lee model does surprisingly well in estimating the spill-over 
effects for the US aggregate wage distribution (see Manning, 2003, chapter 12) and, 
as we shall see in modelling the impact of the NMW in the UK. 
  To estimate the model, one has to make some assumption about the latent 
wage distribution w*(F).  We make the simple assumption that the latent log wage 
distribution is that given in a period prior to the introduction of the minimum wage.  
In the empirical application below we use the first four months of our sample, 
September to October 1998.  As we saw in Figure 1 there is little indication of 
sizeable anticipation effects so this wage distribution is probably not contaminated by 
the impact of the NMW.  
  Some estimates are reported in Table 2.  The model estimated is a non-linear 
least squares model where the dependent variable is the change in the log wage at 
different percentiles of the distribution.  If the initial wage distribution is   and 
the later wage distribution is   then we estimate the following specific version 



















      ( 4 )  For the later period we initially use the five months after the introduction of the NMW 
i.e. April-August 1999.  We do not include in the estimation the few percentiles where 
the wage after the introduction of the NMW is below the minimum was the model is 
not capable of explaining these observations.  We also start by estimating the model 
excluding the top 10 percentiles. 
  The results are reported in Table 2.  The first row reports the spill-over 
parameter β .  The estimate of 0.075 can be interpreted to mean that those workers 
initially paid £3.60 have their pay raised by 7.5%, an estimate that is not enormous 
but is not small either.  To put it in some sort of context, this implies that that direct 
effect of the NMW is to raise the average log wage by 4.7% but the total effect is for 
it to rise by 8.2% implying that the spill-over effects increase the total effect by 3.5% 
i.e. slightly over two-thirds. 
  However there is good reason to think that this very simple model over-states 
the size of the spill-over effects as it ascribes any wage growth seen at the higher 
percentiles of the wage distribution to spill-over effects.  But, because an average 
period of 9 months elapses between our initial and final wage distributions part of this 
can probably be explained by general wage growth.  The second row of Table 2 
estimates a simple model that allows for this assume that, in the absence of the 
minimum wage, log wages would grow by the same amount at all points of the wage 
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The estimates in the second row of Table 2 show that, as one would expect, the 
estimated spill-over effects are reduced and the estimated general wage growth is 
positive though at 6.7% for 9 months it is on the high side.  This implies that both the direct and spill-over effects of the minimum wage are smaller than the previous 
estimates. 
  The rest of Table 1 then investigates the robust of the results to the percentiles 
that are modelled (we consider only those below the median) and the sample period 
used by considering the final period to be September to December 1999 to allow more 
time for spill-over effects to work their way through the wage distribution.  But, in all 
the models that allow for general wage growth the estimated spill-over effects are 
very small: indeed, they are essentially zero for estimates that only use the bottom 
half of the wage distribution. 
  These results are consistent with those using aggregate LFS data where spill-
over effects were found to be very small.  This suggests that the small spill-over 
effects are not the result of the fact that the NMW had only a minimal impact on the 
aggregate wage distribution: we get very similar results here.  This is explored a bit 
further by disaggregating our care homes data into 12 regions.  An individual 
observation is now a percentile of the wage distribution in a particular region.  The 
results are reported in Table 3.  There is some evidence that the spill-over effects are 
larger but not much. 
  An alternative way to investigate the plausibility of the claim that spill-over 
effects are minimal is to look at firm level data and exploit the panel nature of our 
data set.  Define the variable GAP to be the percentage increase in the average hourly 
wage bill required to bring the initial (i.e. before the NMW is introduced) level of 
wages up to the minimum.  If this is all that firms do and there are no spill-over 
effects we will have that in firm i: 
       (6)  10 0 ln(1 ) ii i i ww G A PwG A =++ ≈ + i P
 If on the other hand there are spill-over effects that are largest where GAP is largest 
then we would not expect to be able to accept the hypothesis that the coefficient on 
GAP is equal to one.  Some estimates for the change in log average hourly wages at 
firm-level are presented in Table 4. 
  In the first column we estimate a model where only GAP is included.  This has 
a coefficient of 0.84 suggesting that there is incomplete compliance.  But, once other 
controls are included (column 3) the coefficient rises to 1.022 suggesting close to full 
compliance with little in the way of spill-over effects.  To test the hypothesis that 
employers with larger gaps are more likely to have to raise the wages of other workers 
we include a quadratic in the wage gap (column 2 without other controls and column 
4 with).  This term is not significantly different from zero though it is imprecisely 
estimated. 
  The GAP measure in the first 4 columns is based on assuming that all workers 
have their wages raised to the minimum appropriate to their age.  But, as we have 
seen, many young workers receive the adult minimum so the second four columns 
repeat the regressions computing the GAP measure assuming that the adult minimum 
applies to everyone.  The results are very similar. 
  The results in Table 4 are consistent with the earlier results from the cross-
sectional distribution of wages that spill-over effects are very small.  
The discussion so far has assumed that changes in the wage distribution can 
only be the result of spill-over effects.  But, an alternative hypothesis is employment 
losses.  While Stewart (2001) suggests that, in aggregate, the introduction of the 
NMW did not cause any job losses, Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003) find, using 
this data set, that there were employment losses.  The next section discusses whether 
one can hope to distinguish between these two hypotheses?  
3.  Spill-overs or Disemployment Effects? 
 
There are different reasons why one may see a change in the distribution of wages 
across a period in which a minimum wage is introduced or raised: 
-  general wage growth that would have occurred in the absence of the 
minimum wage 
-  change in wage inequality that would have occurred in the absence of the 
minimum wage 
-  the direct effect of the minimum wage and associated spill-over effects 
-  the direct effect of the minimum wage and associated employment effects 
Can we distinguish between these hypotheses?  One would expect there to be 
different effects.  Figure 2 may help us to understand what we might expect to see.  
Assume the initial log wage distribution is normal with mean zero and a standard 
deviation equal to 0.3.  Now, imagine that there is general wage growth of 2%: this 
obviously shifts the wage distribution up uniformly at all points as the line marked 
‘general wage growth’ shows.  Now, imagine a minimum wage equal to –0.4, which 
affects about 9% of workers is introduced (this is represented by the horizontal line on 
Figure 2).  If there are dis-employment effects that we assume to be that 25% of 
workers initially paid the minimum lose their jobs then the spike at the minimum 
wage will be lower than the proportion initially paid below the minimum and the 
wage distribution will rise at other points.  The change in the wage distribution is 
largest at the bottom but does not go to zero as we move up the pay distribution, 
essentially because the truncation of the wage distribution raise the density of wages 
at all points where there is no truncation.  In contrast a model of spill-over effects 
plausibly has the effect on the wage distribution going to zero.   This discussion suggests that one might hope to be able to distinguish between 
spill-over and disemployment effects of the minimum wage using the different effects 
we would expect on different parts of the wage distribution.  Unfortunately, things 
may not be so straightforward in practice as a combination of general wage growth 
and spill-over effects will lead to a change that looks rather like the dis-employment 
model.  In this case we would want to be able to exploit the fact that the introduction 
of the minimum wage is a sudden change. 
  Changes in underlying wage inequality are going to make things even more 
tricky: in terms of Figure 2 a rise in wage inequality would make the line steeper. 
  In a couple of papers Meyer and Wise (1983a,b) suggested that one could 
estimate the dis-employment effects of the minimum wage by looking att he shape of 
the wage distribution and seeing whether there was any effect like that suggested in 
Figure 2.  But, in the absence of any observation of a period in which the minimum 
wage was not in place to estimate the counter-factual wage distribution, the estimates 
are very sensitive to the assumptions made about the functional form of the wage 
distribution and spill-over effects: Dickens, Machin and Manning (1998) conclude 
that it is completely unreliable as a way to estimate the employment effects of the 
minimum wage. 
  Here, one might hope to be able to use it with more success as we do have 
some information about the wage distribution in the absence of the minimum wage.  
But, it is still hard to separately identify the effect of general wage growth and spill-
over effects.  And, given that this model does so well in explaining the data it is likely 
that one cannot distinguish these two hypotheses.  But, to the extent that part of the 




Because the NMW has been set at a very modest level and because aggregate 
evidence suggests very small spill-over effects, it has had only a minimal impact on 
UK wage inequality.  But, the small spill-over effects might be because of the small 
impact and it is possible that there was widespread anticipation of the introduction of 
the NMW making the impact effect appear very small. 
  In this paper we have investigated these issues using data collected in a postal 
survey of care homes where the NMW affected 40% of workers.  But, we still find no 
evidence of large spill-over effects and very small amounts of anticipation of the 
NMW.  Quite why these effects should be so small is not clear but an interesting 
question for future research.    References  
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 Figure 1 
Proportions Paid Below, At and Just Above the NMW 
 
Response month
 w<£3.60  w=£3.60
 £3.80>=w>£3.60  £4.00>=w>£3.80













1.  The vertical axis is the proportion of workers paid wages in the categories 
reported. 
2.  The figure relates only to those workers aged 22+ who are eligible for the 
adult NMW of £3.60 
3.  The response month ‘0’ is April 1999 the month of introduction of the 
NMW. 
 Figure 2 
The Likely Effects of General Wage Growth, Spill-over effects and job losses 
on changes in the wage distribution 
 
f
 general wage growth  no spill-over/employment effect
 spill-over effects  dis-employment effects








The Determinants of Second Wave Responses 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






























Other  Controls  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1682 1682 1682  501  501  501 
 
Notes. 
1.  Standard errors in brackets 
2.  Sample is restricted to those homes where less than 50% of observations 
are imputed. 
3.  Where other controls are included these are the initial proportion female, 
with a nursing qualification, of the residents paid for by the DSS, the 
average age, the occupational structure, the months of the survey and the 
county in which the home is located. Table 2 
Estimates of the Lee Spill-over model: Aggregate Estimates 
 























































1.  These are the results of estimating the Lee model of (4) (without general 
wage growth) or (5) (with general wage growth). 
2.  Percentiles below the minimum wage after April 1999 are excluded. Table 3 
Estimates of the Lee Spill-over model: Disaggregate Estimates 
 























































1.  As for Table 2 but the data is further disaggregated into 12 regions that 
are. Table 4 
Estimates of Spill-Overs from Firm-Level Panel 
 
  1  2  3 4 5  6  7 8 
initial wage gap  0.836  1.032 1.022 0.541 0.749  0.848  0.907 0.393 
 [0.121]  [0.199] [0.170]  [0.363]  [0.112] [0.189] [0.155]  [0.347] 
  -0.549  1.977   -0.286   2.029  initial wage gap  
squared    [0.444]  [1.320]   [0.439]   [1.225] 
Constant 0.038  0.034 0.083  0.104  0.035 0.032 0.001  0.023 
 [0.010]  [0.010] [0.235]  [0.235]  [0.010] [0.011] [0.237]  [0.237] 
Other Controls  no  no  Yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes 
Observations  617  617  571 571 617  617  571 571 
R-squared 0.07  0.07  0.24  0.25 0.07  0.07  0.24 0.25 
 
Notes. 
1.  In some homes managers did not complete all the information on worker 
characteristics. In these cases where there was missing information on 
hourly wages and/or hours we imputed them using the average for that job 
within that firm.  We then restricted the sample to where less than 50% of 
hours were imputed: experimentation showed that the results are very 
similar as long as those where the majority of hours are imputed are 
excluded. 
2.  The dependent variable is the change in the log average hourly wage.  
Where other controls are included these are the initial proportion female, 
with a nursing qualification, of the residents paid for by the DSS, the 
average age, the occupational structure, the months of the survey and the 
county in which the home is located. Appendix: Representativeness of the Sample 
 
In this Appendix we compare the distributions of the responses to our survey with 
those from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
 
From our survey we report results for care assistants.  For the LFS, we report results 
for private-sector workers in the ‘industry’ ‘social work with accommodation’ (class 
85.31), whose occupation is ‘care assistants and attendants’.  The LFS sample comes 
from March 1998 to February 2000 so approximately coincides with the period of our 
survey. 
 
In the Table below we report selected percentiles of the distribution of the 
characteristics of care assistants in our sample and in the LFS.  We have information 
on age, hours, job tenure and hourly wages.  For age, hours and job tenure there is no 
problem in comparing the variables in our sample and the LFS and the sample sizes 
are both large.  As can be seen from the Table, the distributions are remarkably 
similar. 
 
The comparison of the distribution of hourly wages is made more difficult by 
deficiencies in the LFS data that lead to small sample sizes.  First, wage information 
is only collected in waves 1 and 5 (out of 5) so is automatically missing for 60% of 
observations.  Secondly, the main LFS pay variable (which is derived by dividing 
weekly wages by weekly hours) is now recognized to have very large amount of 
measurement error and its use led to a wild over-estimate of the numbers of workers 
who were affected by the minimum wage (see Dickens and Manning, 2002).  In 
March 1999 it was supplemented by a direct measure of the hourly wage for hourly-
paid workers: this measure has less measurement error but is not observed for all 
workers (for our sample here it is 50%). 
 
As a result of this we only have 167 observations in the LFS on the good measure of 
the hourly wage.  The distribution of this variable is reported in the Table below in the 
row labelled LFS(1).  Its distribution is similar to that in our sample (we restrict 
ourselves here to the post-NMW period as this is the only period for which we have 
the LFS (1) measure).  One other concern is that those who report an hourly rate in the 
LFS are not randomly selected.  A number of methods for dealing with this have been 
proposed (see Dickens and Manning, 2002, for a discussion).  Here we report the 
results using an inverse propensity score re-weighting in the row labelled LFS(2).  For 
our sample, probably because they are so homogeneous, the re-weighted distribution 
is very similar to the unweighted distribution. 
 
All of this evidence suggests that we do not have a problem with the 
representativeness of our sample. In fact the survey and LFS summary statistics 








th 95th  Observations
                  
Ours 18  20 27 37 48 56  60  39316  Age 
LFS 18  20  26 36 49 55  59 3218 
                  
Weekly Ours  9  12  18.5  26  35  39 40  39624 Hours LFS 10  14  20  30  36  40  42 3188 
                  
Ours 2  4  12 24 60 108  132  39905  Tenure 
(months)  LFS 2 3  9  25 60 108  132  3205 
                  
Ours 3.6  3.6  3.6 3.80  4.25  5.04 5.57  21313 
LFS(1) 3.3  3.6  3.6  3.77  4.20  4.75 5.00  167 
Hourly 
Wage 
LFS(2) 3.3  3.6  3.6  3.77  4.15  4.70 5.00  166 
 
 
 